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IS THERE A RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS
EXEMAlPTIONS?
PATRICK LENTA
Associate Professo;; School ofPhilosophy and Ethics, U iversity ofKivazulu-Na tal
This article enquirte whether relgious caim;ant are ever entitled as a matter of right to
exemptions from lawis of general application. The author considers varioues responses to the
ob jectin that religious exemptin are ufair an d shows that aquments purporting to
deonitrate that relmgion is distinctie in a way that marks it as meriting special
constitutional solicittde in the form of exemptions fail. Thi essay then surveys and
a s the plasibility of four prominent kinds of arSumnt in support of recognising a
rgiht to religious exeuptions, with reference to aquments ofr by the Contitutional
Court in putative justification of this right. The four kinds of arguments are asolows
argriments grounded on repc for conscience (1mdersto as percived moral dutie) ;
argriments relating to equality of opportunity; egalitarian arguments; and arguntsr
grounded on respect for conciece (understood as the faculty with which indwiduals search
for uitate meaning).
I INTRODUCTION
Critical comnnentaries appearing in South African law journals that have
engaged with the adjudication of claims for religious exemptions by South
African courts - some of them excellent - have tended to focus, with
justification, on the force of the reasons offered by the courts in question in
support of the granting or refusal to grant religious exemptions in particular
cases.I Almost nothing has been written about an issue conceptually prior to
assessment of South African courts' decisions concerning religious acconino-
dations: whether there is a right to religious exemptions. This may not seem
like an outstanding issue, since the Constitutional Court has recognised a
right to religious exemptions in certain circunstances.2 But the Constitu-
For useful discussions of the way in which the right to freedom of religion has
been applied in South Africa, see Lourens du Plessis 'Afirmation and celebration of
the "religious Other" in South Africa's constitutional jurisprudence on religious and
related rights: menorial constitutionalisin in action' (2008) 8 African Huian Rghts L]
376; Irna Kroese 'God's kingdom in the law's republic: religious freedon in South
African constitutional jurisprudence' (2003) 19 SAJHR 469; Johan van der Vyver
'The contours of religious liberty in South Africa' (2007) 21 Emory Anternational LR
77; Paul Farlan 'Freedon of religion, conscience, thought and beliefin Stuart Wool-
man, Theunis Roux & Michael Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed
(2006) ch 41 and Denise Meyerson 'Religion and the South African Constitution' in
P Radan, D Meyerson & R Croucher (eds) Law and Rel(gion (2005) ch 5.
2 While the Canadian Supreme Court and the South African Constitutional
Court have recognised and continue to recognise a right to religious exemptions, the
position relating to claims for religious exemptions in the United States under the
First Amendment is different. In certain - very few - cases, the Supreme Court
invalidated state laws that burdened religious exercise unless such laws were narrowly
tailored to compelling state interests (see, for example, Sherbert V Vrner 374 US 398
(1963) and Wisconsin 1 Yioder 406 US 205 (1972')). In 1990, however, the US Supreme
Court changed course, holding that there is no constitutional right to religious
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tional Court's recognition of a right to religious exemptions is one thing; its
correctness in doing so a different matter entirely. The question whether
religious claimants are ever entitled to exemptions is important because, if
the court is wrong about this, its recent decision granting a Hindu pupil an
exemption from a school uniform regulation to permit her to wear a nose
stud is perforce mistaken.
In this essay I shall distinguish between and assess the plausibility of certain
prominent arguments in support of, and objections to, recognising a right to
religious exemptions, including arguments offered by the Constitutional
Court in putative justification of this right. By religious exemptions I mean
exemptions from facially neutral laws of general application (that is to say,
laws that do not intentionally target religious believers for adverse treatment)
granted on the grounds that such laws impose a burden on certain religious
believers that is not brought to bear on other citizens. This burden arises
because the laws in question require (sonetinles as a condition of their
receiving a benefit or availing themselves of some opportunity) that religious
believers act in a way that is inconsistent with their religious beliefs or refrain
from engaging in practices motivated by such beliefs. Examples of claims for
exemptions include the claim by a group of Evangelical Christians to be
exempted from legislation proscribing corporal punishment in schools on the
grounds that their religious beliefs require that corporal punishment be
inflicted on pupils in the private schools run in accordance with their faith;'
the claim by a religious pupil to be exempted from school uniform
regulations that forbid the wearing of clothing and adornments with religious
import; and the claim by religious believers for an exemption from drug
laws on the grounds that their rituals of worship incorporate the use of
banned drugs."
Believers claiming exemptions assert, in essence, that they should be
excused from compliance with a particular law or regulation because it makes
acting consistently with their religious com itments impossibl or because
exemptions from laws of general applicability (Eniploymuent Division, Departnent of
Human Resources ofOregon a Smith 494 US 872 (1990)).
M1EC-forEduecation, Kwaulu Natal & others v Pilay 2008 (1) SA474 (CC).
4 See, for example. Christian Educati South Africa v Minister ofJustice 000 (4) SA
757 (CC) and R (T;illiamson v Secretary of State for Education and Employmnt [2005]
AC 246 (HL).
See, for example, R (on the appication of Beumui) v Headteacher an d Governors of
Denbgih High School [2007] 1 AC 100; Pillay supra note 3. See also Multani v Commis-
sion Scolaire Maiuerite-Bour'eoys (2006) 1 SCR 256, which involved a Sikh pupil's
demand that he be permitted to wear a kirpan (a metal dagger) which Sikh men
believe themselves to be obligated religiously to wear at all times.
6 See, for example, Smith supra note 2 and Prince v President of the Law Society of the
Cape of Good Hope 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC).
See, for example, City of Boerne v Flores 521 US 207 (1997). A Catholic church
wished to expand its facilities to accommodate its growing congregation. It claimed
an exemption from local zoning laws restricting its ability to construct an addition.
Acting in violation of the law was impossible since 'the reconstruction could not be
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it coerces them into acting inconsistently with their religious beliefs by
placing a heavy cost on their acting harmoniously with such beliefs: either
criminalisation and punishment (as, for example, in the case of claims for
exemptions by Rastafarians whose rituals of worship incorporate the con-
suimption of drugs proscribed by law) or the denial of some benefit or
opportunity such as an employment or educational opportunity (as with the
claims of religious pupils to be exempted from workplace dress codes or
school uniform regulations). Their claim is that the law requires them to
break faith with their identity- defining religious beliefs and convictions in a
way that is unfairly burdensome. Claimants often, though not invariably,
assert that they have a duty to a higher authority that takes precedence over
their duty to act as the law directs.
A right to religious exemptions is a right to be free of burdens that make
religious conduct either impossible or too costly to perform. It entitles
believers in certain circumstances to an exemption when the law uninten-
tionally imposes a serious burden on them. The protection that it affords is
prima facie rather than absolute. But it does require a sufficiently strong state
interest in order to justify placing serious burdens on religious conduct. The
existence of such a right has been hotly disputed. Although many people
would agree with the South African Constitutional Court that 'the state
should, wherever reasonably possible, seek to avoid putting believers to
extremely painful and intensely burdensome choices of either being true to
their faith or else respectful of the law'." several constitutional scholars and
philosophers deny that religious believers are entitled to exemptions as a
matter of right."
It might be imagined that the existence of a fundamental right to freedom
of religion resolves the debate about whether a right to religious exemptions
exists in favour of recognising such a right. The matter is not so simple,
however, since people disagree about how the right to freedom of religion
should be interpreted. InJohn Locke's A LeIter Concning Toleration, in which
the right to freedom of religion and conscience as a restriction on state power
receives one of its most influential formulations, the state is required to
refrain from making laws concerning religious worship, which falls outside
its legitimate concern. The right to religious freedom is on this rendering a
right to non-persecution only. For Locke, it is not grounds for an exemption
that a legitimate, generally applicable law requires conduct inconsistent with
done without the help of architects and contractors, whorn the city could prevent
from doing the work merely by withholding the necessary permits' (Andrew Koppel-
man 'How shall I praise thee? Brian Leiter on respect for religion' (2010) 47 San Diego
LR 961 at 966).
Christian Education supra note 4 para 35.
See, for example, William Marshall'The case against constitutionally compelled
free exercise exemption' (1990) 40 Case Hstern LR 357; Frederick Mark Gedicks
'An unfirm foundation: The regrettable indefensibility of religious exemptions'
(1998) 20 University of Arkansas at Little Rock L] 555; and Brian Barry Culture and
Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalisni (2001).
3 5
(2012) 129 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL
the conscience of a religious believer. If, for reasons of conscience, he cannot
obey the law he must 'undergo the punishment, which is not unlawful for
him to bear; for the private judgment of any person concerning a law enacted
in political matters, for the public good, does not take away the obligation of
that law, nor deserve a dispensation'."
My intention in this article is not to put forward a new theory of religious
exemptions, but instead to survey existing theories with a view to determin-
ing whether any of them provides a persuasive justification for recognising a
right to religious exemptions. I shall begin by considering an objection to the
granting of religious exemptions - that they are unfair. I shall assess
responses to this objection, intended to show that special constitutional
solicitude towards religion is not unfair since religion is somehow special or
unique. I shall argue that these responses fail and that there is no reason to
privilege religious commitments over secular moral commitments. I shall
then assess the plausibility of (various versions of) four kinds of argument
advanced in support of there being a right to religious exemptions: argu-
ments grounded on respect for conscience (understood as perceived moral
duties); arguments relating to equality of opportunity; egalitarian arguments;
and arguments grounded on respect for conscience (understood as the faculty
with which individuals search for ultimate meaning).
II THE UNFAIRNESS OF SINGLING OUT RELIGION
The main objection to the granting of religious exemptions is that they are
unfair; that is, they represent a form of wrongful discrimination. On this
objection, since religious exemptions immunis religions against legitimate
and important regulatory concerns in a way that amounts to privileging
religious commitments and interests over other deep and genuine commit-
ments and interests, they are unfair. They are unfair because thev violate the
principle of state neutrality defended by liberals such as John Rawls and
Ronald Dworkin.1
Rawls observes that in modern democratic societies there is a diversity of
comprehensive doctrines relating to matters such as religion, philosophy and
the nature of the good life. Fairness requires that the state be neutral towards
different conceptions of the good life. The principle of state neutrality
requires not that laws must be neutral in efect - necessarily, many state laws
will have a differential impact on religious people and on people of different
faiths - but rather neutral in aim: the 'state is not do anything intended to
" John Locke 'A letter concerning toleration' in lan Shapiro (ed) Two Treatises of
Governient and A Letter Concerning Toleration (2003 [1689]) 211 and 243 (rny ernpha-
sis).
" See Denise Meyerson 'Why religion belongs in the private sphere, not the
public square' in Peter Cane, Carolyn Evans & Zoe Robinson (eds) Law and Religion
in Theoretical and Hist orical Context (2008) 44 at 54.
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favour or promote any particular comprehensive doctrine rather than
another, or to give greater assistance to those who pursue it'.12
In the 'tolerant secular society' that Ronald Dworkin supports, although
the state must 'be permissive about religion; it must not make the peacefh1
practice of even a fundamentalist religion illegal', it should nevertheless be
'collectively neutral', neither favouring atheism over religion, nor exhibiting
partiality towards any religion over another. D workin distinguishes
between personally judgmental justifications for restricting people's freedom,
which appeal to or presuppose 'a theory about what kinds of lives are
intrinsically good or bad for the people who lead those lives' (eg an
anti-sodony law that cites the immorality or baseness of the practice) and
itnpersonally iudg mentaljustifications 'that appeal to the intrinsic value of some
impersonal object or state of affairs rather than to the intrinsic value of certain
kinds of lives' (eg a zoning law). 14 He thinks that 'people have responsibility
for their own ethical values, that is, their own convictions about why their
life has intrinsic importance and what kind of life would best realise that value
for them'., Religious convictions fall within the category of ethical values.
Nevertheless, individuals' personal responsibility for their ethical values 'does
not give them an immnuilty from laws . .. that can be justified on sound
distributive or sound impersonally judgmental grounds'. 16
Furthermore, on some understandings of the ideal of the rule of law, it
'commits us to the principle that the law should be the same for everyone:
one law for all and no exceptions'.1 A single set of laws generally applicable
to all is intended to ensure that everyone receives equal treatment irrespec-
tive of race, religion, sexual orientation and so on. From the standpoint of
some supporters of the rule of law, it might appear that 'an enormous range of
cultuiiral differences can be accommodated within a common framework of
liberal laws' and that exemptions are unfair and invidious instances of 'having
different rules for different people in the same society'
On the one hand, then, religious exemptions seem unfair, since by treating
religious concerns preferentially as compared to non-religious convictions
and concerns, the granting of religious exemptions is non-neutral. On the
other hand, religious exemptions have been granted by courts in the United
States, Canada and South Africa consistently with widely-held intuitions in
12 John Rawls Political Lib eralis (1996) 193.
1 Ronald Dworkin 1s Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate
(2006) 58.
14 Ibid at 70-1.
" Ibid at 71.
Ibid at 71 and 73 (my emphasis)
1 Jeremy Waldron 'One law for all? The logic of cultural accommodation' (2002)
59 Washingitoi and Lee LR 3 at 3.
" Barry op cit note 9 at 39.
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favour of granting such exemptions. This generates a puzzle: 19 if religious
exemptions are justified, a platsible answer mist be provided to the question
why it is not unfair to grant religious believers special acconmiodations with
respect to otherwise generally applicable laws.
In a case which involved a claim by a group of Evangelical Christians for
an exemption to legislation prohibiting corporal punishment in schools on
the grounds that the imposition of corporal punishment is central to their
religion, the Constitutional Court responded to the concern about the
unfairness of religious exemptions as follows:
'It is true that to single out a member of a religious cornmunity for
disadvantageous treatment would, on the face of it, constitute unfair discrirni-
nation against that community. The contrary, however, does not hold. To grant
respect to the sincerely held religious views ot a coinmunity and make an
exception tron a general law to acconrnUodate them, wou1l not be untair to
anyone else who did not hold those views ... the essence of equality lies not in
treating everyone the same way, but in treating everyone with equal concern
and respect.'20
But how is the granting of exemptions in favour of religious believers
consistent with treating with equal concern and respect others who continue
to be subject the law? The court offers no explanation as to why it is not
unfair to single out religion for special constitutional solicitude in the form of
exemptions. It does not explain why it would not be unfair to exempt
Christian believers from the proscription on corporal punishment, while
other parents and teachers who believe for moral reasons that pupils ought to
suffer corporal punishment would continue to be subject to the legal
proscription. What it offers instead is a list of ways in which religion is
important: religious organisations 'play a large part in public life'; they
'conniand ethical behaviour from their nienmbers' 21 and religion informs
believers' 'sense of themselves, their comniunity and their universe .22 1n
what follows, I shall assess the court's reasons for singling out religion - its
contribution to the public good, its contribution to morality and its status as a
source of personal and social identity - as well as other arguments that have
been advanced to establish the specialness ofreligion.
It is sometimes argued that religion is special 'by virtue ofthe contributions
believers make to the public good,'in part because it inculcates in citizens the
" See Andrew Koppelinan 'Conscience, volitional necessity, and religious
exemptions' (2009) 15 Legal Theory 215 at 217-8, and Christopher Eisgruber &
Lawrence Sager Regious Freedoi and the Constitution (2007)78-120.
20 Christian Educaton supra note 4 para 42 (my emphasis). In the event, Sachs J
correctly refused to grant an exemption in favour of the association of Evangelical
Christians on the grounds that the right to dignity, coupled with the right not to be
subject to cruel and unusual, inhurnan or degrading punishment, places a duty on the
state to prohibit corporal punishment in schools - a duty that extends even to
Christian private schools.
1 Ibid para 33.
22 Ibid para 36.
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morality on which democratic society depends.23 Although much philan-
thropy is religious in nature, much is provided by non-religious organisa-
tions. As far as the public good is concerned, religion is in fact a mixed
blessing. Religiously-motivated charity work may at times be 'connected
with teaching hatred, sustaining illiteracy of the recipients of support, and
making assistance conditional on support for political activities, not always of
a constructive sort .24 It is hard to determine whether religion is on balance
more valuable than harmful to the public good: 'we find the devoutly
religious among those who were at the forefront of the domestic resistance to
Nazi oppression in the 1930s, and the injustice of apartheid in South Africa
from the 1960s onward and in America in the 1950s and 1960s. We also, of
course, find the devoutly religious among those who bomb abortion clinics
and fly airplanes into buildings'.25
Although religion instills morality, so do schools, civic organisations and
the boy scouts: 'religion may now be one among several methods of
inculcating civic virtue, rather than a necessary method'.26 Many religious
groups promote a morality that is inconsistent with the ethos of democratic
society: they discriminate on the basis of gender, race and sexual orientation
in a way that cannot be counted as publicly valuable. Whatever value, fiom
the perspective of morality, religion may possess may well be 'offset by its
negative results, such as the maintenance and fostering of prejudices,
authoritarianism, discrimination against women etc'. which provide a reason
to refuse to extend special protection to religious practices .27
American scholar of law and religion John Witte Jr claims that 'religion is a
unique form of individual and personal identity'. 2 But religion is not
distinctive in this respect: philosophical and secular moral beliefs play a role
similar to religious beliefs in constituting a person's identity.2 Witte argues
further that 'religion is ... a unique form of public and social identity,
involving a vast plurality of sanctuaries, schools, charities, missions and other
forms and forums of faith'.30 But many aspects of sectular life have institu-
23 Amy Gutmann ldentity in Demiocracy (2003) 162. Practices considered socially
valuable are often thought to warrant exemptions from generally applicable laws.
Because society often values the work of charitable organisations, they are in many
liberal democracies exempt from the general rules pertaining to taxation.
24 Ibid at 164.
2 Brian Leiter 'Why tolerate religion?' (2008) 25 Constitutional Cornrnentary 1 at
16. To determine whether religion's contribution to the public good is predomi-
nantly positive or negative would require 'much more empirical evidence' (Brian
Leiter 'Foundations of religious liberty: Toleration or respect?' (2010) 47 San Diego
LR 935 at 956).
6 Mark Tushnet 'The emerging principle of accommodation of religion (dubit-
ante)' (1988) 76 Geo etown LJ1691 at 1696.
2 Gidon Sapir & Daniel Statinan 'Why freedom of religion does not include
freedom fron religion' (2005) 24 Law and Philosophy 467 at 470-2.
28 John WitteJr Reion and the American Constitional Experiment (2005) 250.
1 Marshall op cit note 9 at 380-2.
3 Witte op cit note 28 at 250.
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tional structures attached to them that are enormously important to people:
'Politics, class, ethnicity, cultural traditions and so on all seem to play the
same kind of role. in some instances. much more powerfully than religion
does'.31
Those who argue that religion is special sometimes claim that religious
believers hold their beliefs with a special intensity. But intensity of conmit-
inent does not distinguish religion. This subjective account of religion's
specialness is under-inclusive: the desire of the religious to engage in religious
practices may not be particularly intense. It is also over-inclusive: those
opposed to a partictular law on non-religious grounds may hold their beliefs
with equal passion and intensity. Nevertheless, '[n]obody wants to give [an]
exemption to someone who is intensely attached to his car, however sincere
the attachment may be'.32
It is also sometimes argued that the law ought to defer to a believer's fear of
extra-temporal consequences; that the burden of obeying a law is greater for
a person who believes that complying with the law in question will result in
his suffering eternal damnation than for non-believers who do not fear such
punishment because they do not believe in life after death. 'This argument is
implausible, however. The threat of eternal punishment is neither character-
istic of all religions, nor of all religious obligations. Moreover, 'we cannot
generalise confidently about whether [religious believers who believe in
some kind of after-life] sutffer more torment from violating their consciences
than do nonbelievers who contravene their deepest convictions in the only
life they expect to live'.
Michael McConnell argues that religion is special on the grounds that [i]f
the scope of religious liberty is defined by religious duty . . . and if the claims
of civil society are subordinate to the claims of religious freedom, it would
seem to follow that the dictates of religious faith nust take precedence over
the laws of the state, even if they are secular and generally applicable'.3
McConnell clainis that religion has a unique claim to acconimodation since it
involves a 'duty to a higher authority' in a way that secular moral
conmiitments do not.
'There are three reasons why McConnell's contentions in support of
singling out religion should not engage our sympathy. First, manyl religions
are not theistic and so cannot generate the unique source of moral authority
that McConnell claims for religion. Many religious believers do not perceive
a duty to a higher authority. Secondly, the claim by certain religious believers
Leiter (2008) op cit note '5 at 14.
Martha Nussbaum Liberty of Concience: In Defence of Aeiricas Tradition of Reli-
giou Eqrualit (2008) 167.
Kent Greenawalt Religion and the Constitution: Free Exercise and Fairness (2006)
131.
34 Michael McConnell'The origins and historical understanding offree exercise of
religion'(1 990) 103 Harvard LR 1409 at 1453.
; Michael McConnell 'The problem of singling out religion' (2000) 50 DePaul
LR1 at 30.
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that thex are under a duty to a higher authority that takes precedence over
the duty to obey the law is based on contested theological propositions the
truth of which. if we concur with Locke's judgment that the government
should not be the arbiter of theologically contentious claims, the state is not
in a position to affirm. 6 From a standpoint external to the religion of which
the member is claiming an exemption, there is no reason to think that a
religious believer is commanded by a metaphysical power. All that must be
assented to from an external perspective is that religious believers may believe
themselves to be under an obligation to an authority higher than the law.
Thirdly, the fact that religious believers experience religious obligations as
taking precedence over secular obligations does not distinguish this belief in
the right way, for secular moral convictions may equally be considered by
those on whom they exert an influence as non-optional duties; there is no
reason to assume that as a matter of real-world phenomenology, religious
convictions exercise a more powerful grip upon the individual psyche than
do deeply felt secular convictions' Secular connitments may be so
compelling that an individual would die rather than betray them.
'That religious and non-religious moral beliefs may have a similar influence
on individuals is acknowledged in two draft exemption decisions, in which
the US Supreme Court effectively eroded the distinction between religious
and non-religious claims to exemptions. U nited States v Seeger3 involved a
claim for exemption from the Selective Service Act, which exempted from
the draft anyone 'who, by reason of religious training or belief. is conscien-
tiously opposed to participation in war in any form'. 'The Act defined
religious training and belief as 'an individual's belief in a supreme being,
involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does
not include essentially political, sociological or philosophical views or merely
a personal moral code'.40 Seeger claimed a conscientious objector exemption
from the military draft on the grounds of a secular moral objection to fighting
in a war. The US Supreme Court, to which the case was appealed, avoided
declaring the legislation unconstitutional by construing the term "supreme
bing' broadly, so that the test was 'whether a given belief that is sincere and
meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by
the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption'. 41
The court decided that Seeger was entitled to an exemption 'in the light of
his beliefs and the unquestioned sincerity with which he held them' 42
Welsht v United States,43 a subsequent US Supreme Court decision,
likewise concerned a claim for exemption fiom the draft law on the grounds
" See Locke op cit note 10 at 230 and 241.
Eisgruber & Sager op cit note 19 at 103.
Ibid at 104.
31 380 US 163 (1965).
40 United States v Seeger 326 F 2d 846 at 847, quoting 50 USCA 456 (j) (rev 1948).
-Seeger supra note 39 at 165-6.
42 Ibid at 187.
3 Wlsh P United States 398 US 333 (1970).
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of secular conscientious objection. The court ruled that the claimant's beliefs
were 'religious'. since to qualify as such it was necessary that his 'opposition
to war stem from ... moral, ethical or religious beliefs about what is right and
wrong and that these beliefs be held with the strength of traditional religious
convictions'.44 The plurality held that the draft law 'exempts from military
service all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or
religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves
to become part of an instrument of war'.
'The essential issue to which these cases give rise is that raised by Dworkin:
whether it is acceptable to exclude from the ambit of an exemption 'those
whose morality is not based on religion' .46 His answer is that 'the invasion of
personality in forcing men to kill when they believe killing immoral is just as
great when these beliefs are based on secular grounds. .A government that
is sec-ular on principle cannot prefer a religious to a non-religious morality as
such' .1 The tolerant secular society that Dworkin advocates
'does not attach any special value to religion as a phenomenon. It knows that
inany of its menbers do attach great importance to their freedom to choose
their own religious cornnitments and life, and it is of course anxious to respect
that conviction. But it also knows that other inembers attach comparable
importance to making other choices about how to live ... that reflect their
own different convictions about what lives would be good for them.... [To
give] special protection to religious people or practices would be regarded in
such a society as discrimination in their favour because it would leave other
people open to constraints on their freedom in the exercise of choices that, for
them, reflect the values of the same ethical character and function of religious
values ofreligious people'."
Finally, some US commentators argue that religion is special because the
framers of the US Constitution 'rejected wording that spoke in general of
"rights of conscience" and chose wording that singled out religion for free
exercise protection .49 A tempting response to this is to say that what is
14 Ibid at 340.
A Ibid at 343-4.
46 Dworkin Takir/Q Rihts Seriously (1978) 200.
A Ibid at 201.
48 Dworkin op cit note 13 at 61. Martha Nussbaum argues that religion is special,
but only because she adopts the expanded definition of religion accepted by the US
Supreme Court in See&er supra note 39 and Uelsh supra note 43, the conscientious
objection cases. Nussbaum op cit note 32 at 172-3 approves of the Supreme Court's
acconunodation of 'non-religious searchers' by 'stretching the account of religion'
and is likewise in favour of accommodating the non-religious under the rubric of
religion. But from the perspective of analytical clarity, including the avowedly non-
religious and anti-religious within the definition of religion is obfuscatory, unless
everyone, including atheists, is in some sense religious. As Kent Greenawalt 'The
significance of conscience' (2010) 47 San Diego LR 901 at 911 points out, however,
'atheism and agnosticism are not religions' but rather 'convictions about religion'.
A Nussbaum op cit note 32 at 164. See also Laurence Tribe AmeriJcan, Contituional
Law (1988) 1189. The text of the First Amendment reads: 'Congress shall pass no lawx
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof'
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needed is for it to be shown that singling out religion for special tre atment is
not unfair. The text of the US Constitution does not provide a reason for
singling out religion. In any case, this textual argument for the uniqueness of
religion lacks all force in the South African context. To the extent that the
text of the South African Constitution has any bearing on the question of
whether religion is special, it is that religion is not special. Section 15(1) of
the Constitution provides: 'Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience,
religion, thought, belief and opinion. This provision protects both religious
and non-religious conscience.
The above analysis reveals that arguments purporting to show that religion
is distinctive in a way that marks it as meriting special constitutional solicitude
in the form of exemptions are vulnerable to overwhelming objections. These
arguments fail to identify anything distinctive about religion that warrants
special constitutional treatment. No adequate response has been presented to
the objection that religious exemptions are unfair. As eminent 'law and
religion' scholar Frederick Mark Gedicks, himself a believer, acknowledges,
these arguments offer no 'plausible explanation of why religious believers -
and only believers - are constitutionally entitled to be excused froni
complying with otherwise legitimate laws'.so To exempt religious believers
only really does seem, contrary to Sachs J's views in Christian Education, unfair
to similarly situated others whose conscientious conmnitments likewise
conflict with the law in question. I
III THE SPECIALNESS OF CONSCIENCE
The failure of arguments intended to establish the specialness of religion -
intended, that is, to show the fairness of giving religious convictions
preferential treatment relative to secular moral commitments - has
prompted certain constitutional theorists and political philosophers to offer
justifications for exemptions based on the specialness of conscience, where
conscience is broadened beyond the scope of religious convictions to include
secular moral conuniinents. 52 The claim here is that people have a right to an
exemption when necessary to permit then to act in conformity with their
" Gedicks op cit note 9 at 574 (emphasis in original).
1 In Wisconsin v Yoder 406 US 205 (1972), Burger J exempted the Anish but no
other group of conscientious objectors from mandatory schooling laws. The court
declared that 'purely secular considerations' would not warrant an exemption: 'Thus,
if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection
of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, rnuch as Thoreau
rejected the social values ofhis time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims
would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was philosophical and personal
rather than religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion
Clauses' (ibid at 216). The court's position is mistaken in the same say that Sachs J is
mistaken in Christia Ed ucation, as Amy Guttman, in Identity in Democracy (2003) 183,
criticising Yoder, rightly notes: 'Exemptions froma lasw for only religious convictions
discriminate against secular conscientious believers.'
52 See, for example, Michael Sandel Democracys Di oet: Amerca in Search of a
Public Philosophy (1996) 65-71; Willian Galston The Practice ofLiberal Plura(ism (2005)
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perceived relgious or non-relgious moral duties. Arguments for a conscience-
based right to exemptions have special salience for countries like South Aftica
and Canada, whose constitutions explicitly protect freedom of conscience, as
the US Constitution does not.
William Galston, for example, argues in favour of a principle of expressive
liberty, 'the noriatively privileged and institutionally defended ability of
individuals and groups to lead lives as they see fit ... in accordance with their
own understanding of what gives meaning and worth to human existence'.
This principle supports the claim that conscience 'enjoys a rebuttable
presumption in the face of public law'." He argues that there are liberal
grounds for exempting members of religious groups 'from many (not all)
laws that have the effect of restricting religious fie exercise and that 'absent
compelling reasons to the contrary, principled liberals must defer to individu-
als' own sense of what gives life meaning and purpose'."' 'Conscience is
special' because it is central to 'personal integrity'.>6 He does not limit the
claims of conscience, understood as deep convictions, to claims of religious
conscience, since secular individuals 'come to embrace ensembles of belief
and action' that share two central features of religious experience: they
understand the requirements of these beliefs and actions as central to their
identity, and they experience these requirements as authoritative commands.
Conscience-based claims for acconmiodation are presumptive only and can
be defeated by a sufficiently strong state interest: 'Deep convictions may be
mistaken in ways that the state may rightly resist through the force of law'and
the social or civic consequences of the individual's conscience-based conduct
may expose it to justified regulation or even prohibition'."-
45-71; Gutmann op cit note 23 at 45-71 and Paul Bou-Habib 'A theory of religious
accommodation' (2006) 23Journal ofApplied Phiosoph) 109.
3 The US Constitution provides protection only for religious claims to con-
science, not for conscience broadened to include secular claims for conscience. There
has nevertheless been some support for the recognition of a right to freedom of
conscience in the US. Michael Perry 'From religious freedom to moral freedom'
(2010) 47 San Diego LR 993 has argued in support ofa 'right to inoral freedoin' (ibid at
996), 'a broadening out of the right to religious freedon that he characterises as 'the
right to live one's life in harmony with one's moral convictions and commitments'
(ibid at 996), where moral convictions and commnitments are understood to include
secular moral as well as religious conunitments. This right is a right to be free of the
burden placed by a law on the exercise of conscience. It is not absolute: a burden
would not count as a violation of the right if the law in question is 'necessary to serve a
legitimate government interest' (ibid at 1008).
54 Galston op cit note 52 at 67-8.
* Ibid at 177.
6 Ibid at 179. This chimes with K Anthony Appiah's claim (see The Ethics of
identity (2005) 99) that we can distinguish 'between [those] who, with Luther, declare
Ich kann nicht anders, and the Mr Bartlebys who simply "prefer not to"' on the grounds
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Another influential argument in favour of recognising a right to
conscience-based exemptions asserts that the will to be moral is valuable in
itself and that respect for the will to be moral is part of respect for persons.
An Gutmann's argument for cons cience-based exemptions is grounded on
the intrinsic value and specialness of conscience, 'the distinctively human
effort to conceive and to live an ethical life which democracy presupposes
when it is conitted to the ideal of reciprocal respect for persons'.""
Conscience, Gutnann holds, is a 'feature of ethical personhood' which has
'become synonymous with ethical identity', 'the effort to live according to
a sense of goodness and justice'.60 As Andrew Koppelman approvingly
comments in response to Gutmann, '[a] well-functioning human being is
disposed to heed her conscience, and this disposition is damaged whenever
she succumbs to pressure to violate her conscience'.6,
The 'respect for conscienc' argument has at least two disadvantages. The
first relates to practical difficulties. Since it extends the right to exemptions to
include non-religious as well as religious claims, adjudicating claims becomes
more difficult, since adjudicative bodies will face greater epistenic difficul-
ties in assessing which are genuine claims of conscience and which are not,
without reference to texts, doctrines and group rituals characteristic of
religion. 62 Further, there is likely to be a greater number of claims for
Gutinann op cit note 23 at 176 states that although exemptions should not be
granted automatically, since this would undermine the ability of duly constituted
majorities to make law, 'because conscience represents ultimate ethical cornnmit-
ments, a democratic government that fails to consider exempting conscientious
objectors from sorne laws ... fails to take the ethical identities of persons as seriously
as it can without sacrificing the democratic pursuit of public purposes'. Consistently
with democratic justice, conscience should be deferred to 'when it is compatible with
upholding law's legitimate public purpose' (ibid at 177).
"Ibid at 168.
W Ibid at 171. Several arguments offered in justification of conscience-based
exemptions make reference, as Gutmann's does, to the importance of inoral beliefs to
the identity of individuals and argue that respect for persons requires that the state
graint exemptions in recognition of the identity-defining nature of moral beliefs.
Sandel op cite note 52 at 67 argues that for religious believers 'the observance of
religious duties is a constitutive end, essential to their good and indispensible to their
identity'. Appiah op cit note 56 at 99 argues that failure to accormmodate conscien-
tious objection can coerce people into 'betray[ing] their legitimate sense of who they
are', since people's conscientious coinmitinents and practices are 'likely to represent
deeply constitutive aspects of people's identity' (ibid). Martha Nussbaum Women and
Huian Developient (2000') 180 argues that because religion is 'so important to many
people, such a major source of identity', there is a strong argument fron respect for
persons for recognising religious capability: 'When we tell people that they cannot
define the ultimate meaning of life in their own way ... we do not show full respect
for then as persons'. Galston op cit note 52 at 67 argues that those with noral beliefs
understand the requirements of their beliefs and actions as 'central rather than periph-
eral to their identity'.
(1 Koppelinan op cit note 19 at 240.
See Leiter (2010) op cit note 25 at 958 and Nussbaum op cit note 32 at 170.
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exemptions than if exemptions were restricted to religious believers, and this
larger number will impose a greater burden on society.63
A second difficulty is that the 'respect for conscience' argument is
under-inclusive, because it excludes certain forms of religious conduct that
are not experienced as matters of duty, but which many think should be
accommodated. Most in favour of religious accommodations think that the
claim by members of the Native American Church to be permiitted to use
peyote as part of their sacramental practice should have been granted by the
US Supreme Court in Employment Division v Smith.6' But neither of the
claimants in Smith felt duty-bound to use peyote. Smith was motivated
primarily by his interest in exploring his Native American racial identity.65 In
Prince, which involved a claim by a Rastafarian for an exemption fiom drug
laws to allow him to use cannabis as part of his sacramental practices, the
majority of the South African Constitutional Court deemed the use of
cannabis 'not obligatory ',66 yet it did not refuse to grant an exemption for this
reason. 'The Canadian Supreme Court, the British House of Lords and the
South African Constitutional Court have all affirmed that there may be a
right to an exemption even in cases in which the claim relates to a
non-obligatory practic .67
One way to include claims relating to non-obligatory practices under the
rubric of conscienc -based exemptions is to argue that such claims for
exemptions are justified on the grounds that 'religious conduct that aims at
achieving conmiunion with a divine will or ultimate reality' has a claim for
acconoidation because it enables religious believers to 'discover what [theirj
duties in fact are' .68 In the case of the ingestion of peyote as a ritual or
sacramental practice of the Native American Indians, 'they perform it to gain
insight' about the nature of their duties. Thus, 'performing the ritual will, by
informing them of their duties, indirectly enable them to act in accordance
with their perceived duties'.69
This argument is not wholly compelling, however, since several non-
obligatory practices in respect of which there may be a right to an exemption
are not practices of worship. In Pillay, the Constitutional Court granted a
Hindu pupil an exemption to permit her to wear a nose stud prohibited by a
Leiter ibid at 958.
6 Supra note 4.
* Koppehnan op cit note 19 at 222. In Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association 485 US 439 (1988), another widely criticised decision, Native Americans
objected to a proposed logging road that would pass through an ancient worship site
central sacred to their tribe, and which, the US Supreme Court conceded would
,virtually destroy' the ability of Native Americans 'to practice their religion' (ibid at
451). The court refused to grant an accommodation because the road had 'no ten-
dency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs' (ibid at 450).
Prince supra note 4 at 103.
7 See S)ndicat Northarest v Amselem (2004) 2 SCR 551 at 67-8, Williamson supra
note 4 at 53 and Pillay supra note 3 at 65 respectively.
" Bou-Habib op cit note 52 at 123, emphasis in original.
69 Ibid.
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school uniform regulation even though the practice was only expressive of
her religion and not required by it. Although there is some dispute about this,
Sikhs wear turbans, and some Muslim women wear headscarves, out of
custom rather than obligation. Yet many believe that there should be
exemptions sometimes to permit Sikh men to wear turbans and Muslim
wormen to wear headscarves. Even where dress is a matter of convention, it
may be 'heavily freighted with symbolic import' to the extent that to
abandon it is 'no trivial matter'. 'The reason why requiring believers to
abandon these religious practices is not a trivial matter is that it 'can
reasonably be considered as central to the practitioner's identity'71 and can
affect her acceptance within her community.
IV EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
Another kind of argument in support of a right to religious exemptions
assimilates claims of religious duty to physical disability on the grounds that a
person who believes himself to be under a religious obligation will experi-
ence no choice in the matter.72 Religious beliefs are not chosen; most come
with upbringing. And when a set of religious beliefs is instilled in an
individual, then, in the words of G A Cohen, 'we cannot regard its convinced
adherent as choosing to retain it any more than we can regard him as
choosing to retain his belief that the world is round'. Religious beliefs, it
might be claimed, may be an encumbrance analogous to physical disability:
the person who believes himself to be under a religious duty may not have
chosen to hold that belief. and cannot choose to cease having that belief, any
more than the handicapped person has chosen his affliction and can choose to
cease having it. A disability, such as a lack ofphysical mobility due to injury or
disease, supports a strong prima facie claim to acconmodation, because it
limits the opportunity to engage in activities others are able to engage in:
'[I]f the law against jaywalking bears harshly on a person because he suffers fron
a disability that iipedes his mobility and makes it difficult for him to cross the
street during the permitted time in which the "Walk" sign is flashing, this is a
ground for accommodation - say by adding extra seconds to the "WaNlk"
7 Barry op cit note 9 at 58-9.
" Jonathan Quong 'Cultural exemptions, expensive tastes, and equal opportuni-
ties' (2006) 23journal ofApplied Philosophiy 53 at 58.
Sonu Bedi 'What is so special about religion? The dilemma of the religious
exemption' (2007) 15 Thejournal ofPolitical Philosophy 235 at 240 argues that 'the only
way to justify' religious exemptions is to distinguish religious beliefs and practices
from other preferences on the grounds that they are involuntary and unchosen. San-
del op cit note 52 at 70 disputes 'the conception of persons as freely choosing selves,
unencumbered by antecedent moral ties' and refers to 'the claims of those for whom
religion is not an expression of autonomy but a matter of conviction unrelated to a
choice' (ibid at 66-7 ). In his view, accommodations are justified 'to prevent persons
bound by moral duties they cannot renounce from having to violate either those
duties or the law' (ibid at 68).
7 GA Cohen 'On the currency of egalitarianjustice' (1989) 99 Ethics 906 at 936.
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interval or by permitting him to assert a right ofwxay against oncoming traffic by
brandishing a cane or using a wheelchair. .'74
There is likewise a strong prima facie reason to accommodate religious
belies, it might be argued, because such beliefs limit the opportunity of
believers to engage in activities in which others are able to engage.
Is the assimilation of religious belies to unchosen handicaps correct?
There is disagreement on this issue between certain influential theorists of
distributive justice. Cohen recommends that those with 'expensive tastes' -
for fine wines and seafood, for example, who need more resources to achieve
the same amount of welfare as those with less expensive tastes - should be
compensated for this reason, provided that they have them involuntarily (that
is, could not have helped having them), in which case their possessor cannot
be held responsible for them.7 Expensive tastes reduce the opportunity to
lead a fulfilling life, typically generating an involuntary welfare deficit.
Cohen thinks that we can treat religious beliefs analogously to expensive
tastes: since the individual did not choose to hold these belies, and has them
through no fault of his own, he should not be required to bear the costs of
these beliefs, but should, as a requirement of justice, be compensated for the
resulting burdens.76
Barry disagrees. Equality, he argues, is not concerned with equalising
welfare. but instead with a fair distribution of 'rights, resources and
opportunities'7 People are free, within the structure established by that
distribution, to pursue their chosen conception of the good and to make
choices depending on their preferences and belies. It may be that some
individuals' conceptions of the good, by demanding more resources or more
than their allocated liberty, are more difficult to fulfil than others. 'But this
has no significance . .. it is irrelevant to any claims based on justice, since
justice is guaranteed by equal opportunities." Like Dworkin, Barry thinks
that individuals should not be compensated for the costs arising fi-on
religious and cultural beliefs, which he, like Dworkin, treats as akin to
expensive tastes'.7 He thinks, as Dworkin does, that although people do not
74 Richard Arneson 'Against freedom of conscience' (2010) 47 San Diego LR 1015
at 1028.
71 Cohen describes the position he defends as equality of access to advantage,
according to which there should be equality of opportunity for welfare as well as
resources, and satisfaction of needs.
7 See Cohen op cit note 73 and G A Cohen 'Expensive tastes and multicultural-
ism'in Rajeev Bharga va, Aiyia Kumar Bagchi & R Sudarshan (eds) MIulticulturalism,
Liberalisi and Democracy (1999) 80-100.
7 Barry op cit note 9 at 35.
Ibid at 32.
7 From the standpoint of Dworkin's account of equality of resources, set out in
Soveren irtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (2000), religious beliefs are not
analogous to serious physical and mental disabilities. Dworkin's central distinction is
between a person'sprsonaity, which includes character, convictions and preferences,
and his personal resources, which include health and strength. He argues that we
should aim, as a matter of justice, to erase or nutigate differences in people's personal
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choose their beliefs, they can be held responsible for their consequences on
the grounds that thev identifi with them - 'that they own them'.so A
physical disability should be accommodated as a matter of justice because it
'limits the opportunity to engage in activities that others are able to engage
in'." Religious and moral beliefs are by contrast 'not an encumbrance in
anything like the way in which a physical disability is an encumbrance', Barry
argues, since their effect is not to limit opportunities, but to 'bring about a
certain pattern of choices from among the set of opportunities that are
similarly placed physically or financially'.82 He insists that the existence of an
opportunity does not depend on the subjective disposition of the individual
to take advantage of it. Rather, the existence of an opportunity is 'an
objective state of affairs'. 3 Since people should be held responsible for their
beliefs, and belief-holders have the same opportunities as everyone else,
resources -'should aim to improve the position ofpeople who are physically handi-
capped' for example -but should not ain to nutigate or compensate for differences
in personality' (ibid at 286) or for burdens attributable to the fact that some people's
convictions and tastes are expensive, since someone with expensive tastes does not
have fewer resources at his command. Dworkin distinguishes (as do all luck egalitar-
ians) between chance and choice. If something results from choice, it is open to
assignments o responsibility; if luck, then not: 'individuals should be relieved of
consequential responsibility for those unfortunate features of their situation that are
brute bad luck, but not from those that should be seen as flowing from their choices'
(ibid at 287). A just society should therefore compensate an individual with a disabil-
ity, which is a matter of bad luck. Why then should having expensive tastes and
convictions not be considered a matter of bad luck? Dworkin acknowledges that
certain kinds of cravings - lust for example - can be considered handicaps, and so
be assimilated to resource deficiency ifthei dat iishes he did not have them because they
interfere with what he wants to do with his life and give him frustration or pain if they
are not satisfied (ibid at 82). Beliefs and convictions, by contrast, are 'ntenoven with
judgments of endorsement and approval'. They 'define for us what a satisfying or
gratifying life would be'. In view of the agent's avowal of his commitments, it is, he
thinks, 'bizarre' to call his having them bad luck (ibid at 291). As Dworkin puts it:
'Resources and handicaps ... enable or limit us in their ability to do what we wish to
do. Beliefs [and convictions] . those we do not struggle against or hope to
eliminate but rather take satisfaction in - determine what it is we wish to do. We
enjoy or labour under the former. But we reason or feel or puzzle our way to the
latter, and it is amongst the most basic of our ethical assumptions that responsibility for
such judgment is our own.' (Ibid at 293.) An individual's personality may be uncho-
sen, but he should nevertheless be held responsible for it in virtue of the fact that he
identifies with the beliefs and tastes of which it is made up (ibid at 294). Compensa-
tion is in order only when people disidentify with their beliefs and tastes (in the sense
of xishing they did not have them). Dworkin expresses disagreement with Cohen's
contention that 'although someone whose religion imposes strenuous burdens on his
life xxould not regard his faith as a handicap or wish to lose it if he could, there is
nevertheless no reason why "we", who do not accept his religion, could not treat it as
a handicap, and compensate him for its extra costs' (ibid at 295).
'o Barry op cit note 9 at 36.
Ibid at 36.
82 Ibid at 37.
13Ibid at 37.
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Barry argues that religious exemptions are not required as a matter of right or
justice, though he thinks that they may be granted in a narrow range of cases
out of a utilitarian concern for the alleviation of sufferingI
Several responses to Barry are open to supporters of a right to religious
exemptions. If we wish to defend the claim that religious beliefs should be
accommodated as a matter of justice in the way handicaps are, we may,
following Cohen, argue that individuals often do not 'take satisfaction in'
their beliefs as Dworkin puts it,"- or 'freely embrace' them in Barry's
formulation: 8 some people holding religious beliefs are too unreflective to
form a second-order belief-avowing preference. We could add that while it
may be true that most individuals whose religious beliefs hamper their lives
would not wish that they did not have these beliefs, most would regret not
that they have these beliefs, but that these beliefs happen to be expensive7
The relevant bad luck does not ie in having the belief, but only in its being
expensive. We could also say, as Cohen does in a recent response to
Dworkin, that the reason that Dworkin and Barry give for withholding
compensation in respect of expensive tastes individuals' approving
identification with them - is a reason for offering rather than refusing
compensation 'since it is the agents' very bad luck that a preference with
which they strongly identify happens to be expensive, and to expect them to
forgo or restrict satisfaction of that preference (because it is expensive) is,
therefore, to ask them to accept an alienation from what is deep in them'."
Not all equality of opportunity arguments in favour of religious and
cultural exemptions rest on the idea that because religious beliefs are
unchosen, they should be treated on a par with serious disability. David
Miller asserts that equality of opportunity entails that people 'should have an
equal chance to live the kind of life that their culture prescribes '," which
obligates the state to 'respond in an even-handed way to the various aims and
ambitions that people have'.9o Miller challenges Barry's claim that unlike
serious disabilities, religious and moral beliefs do not limit opportunities.
Barry insists that the existence of an opportunity does not depend on the
subjective disposition of the individual to take advantage of it. Rather, the
existence of an opportunity is 'an objective state of affairs'."' As Miller argues,
however, this is implausible, since an opportunity to do something is not just
the physical possibility of doing it, but the possibility of doing it 'without
8 Ibid at 39.
Dworkin op cit note 79 at 293.
6 Barry op cit note 9 at 37.
8 See Cohen op cit note 73 and GA Cohen 'Expensive taste rides again' in Justine
Burley (ed) Dworkin and His Critics (2004) 3 at 10-13.
8 Cohen in Dw orkin and Hi, Crtic ibid at 7.
8' David Miller Liberalisn, equal opportunities and cultural commitments' in
Paul Kelly (ed) Multicutraism Recotsidered (2002) 45 at 48.
90 Ibid at 54.
9 Barry op cit note 9 at 37.
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incurring excessive costs, or the risk of such costs'.92 Where the costs of
taking advantage of the opportunity (or the risk of such costs) are too high,
the opportunity is effectively blocked, as the opportunity of students of
modest means to enter higher education may be blocked if their parents
would be required to r-mortgage their homes for this purpose.
Miller argues that the costs that should attract our concern in the context
of religious beliefs are not those relating to constraints intrinsically connected
to the belief in question: 'It is no failure of opportunity that Jews cannot eat
pork while others can.'3 The problem arises where the conscientious beliefs
intersect with legal or other norms of the wider society, so that the individual
faces constraints over and above the constraints intrinsically connected to his
commitments. This occurs where, for example, religious individuals feel
conscientiously compelled to wear clothing forbidden by the dress code of a
school or workplace. The costs of taking advantage of this educational or
employment opportunity, which requires conduct inconsistent with the
individual's conscientious beliefs, potentially include a violation of 'personal
identity'94 and integrity, as well as exclusion from the relevant religious
conimunity. These costs are 'sufficiently great that, by parity of reasoning
with the higher education example ... the opportunity is effectively
blocked'.9
Miller suggests, plausibly, that religious and other conscientious commit-
ments should not be treated 'as though they were on a par with physical
disabilities','6 since those with physical handicaps are prevented from taking
advantage of certain opportunities and there is nothing that they can do
about it, whereas religious believers are in a position to reflect on and revise
beliefs that were part of their upbringing and adopt new beliefs. Neverthe-
less, since it is 'reasonable to assume that rapid revision of these commitments
would be costly' we have 'good reason to think that an equal opportunity
state should treat [conscientious] connitnents as givens'.
Jonathan Quong argues in an important article that even if religious beliefs
are unchosen, justice requires that all individuals be given a reasonable
chance to pursue their conception of the good, provided that everyone else
has the same chance. He capitalises on Rawls's assertion that 'the state is to
ensure for all citizens equal opportunity to advance any [permissible]
2Miller op cit note 89 at 5 1.
Ibid at 50.
94 Ibid at 56.
9 Ibid at 52.
9 Ibid at 54.
Ibid at 55. Terry Eagleton Reason, Faith and Re'olution (2009) 138-9 remarks
that 'inore is involv ed in changing really deep-seated beliefs than just changing your
mind.... Because certain of our commitments are constitutive of who we are, we
cannot alter them without what Christianity traditionally calls a conversion, which
involves a lot more thanjust swapping one belieffor another'.
' Miller ibid.
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conception of the good they freely affirm',9 where fair equality of opportu-
nity refers to 'the conditions that obtain when people with similar abilities
and ambitions have the same chances of success'."'o In Quong's view,
granting exemptions will be pennissible in cases in which a law restricts
citizens from pursuing their conception of the good, but exemptions will be
a requirement of iustice, rather than merely permissible, in cases in which the
collision between the religious or cultural beliefs in question and the law
results in a believer's being prevented from taking up basic civic opportuni-
ties like employment and education, since this constitutes a denial of fair
equality of opportunity. What is important for Quong is the opportunity to
combine one's conception of the good with a basic civic opportunity, such as
eniploynient or education.'(o
The reason Quong gives for expanding equality of opportunity so that
religiously-motivated practices should be considered when deciding
whether employment and educational opportunities have been fairly allo-
cated is that, although Rawls does not consider the holding of religious and
cultural beliefs as a primary good, having the opportunity to pursue religious
and cultural values is nevertheless
'generally seen as a fundamental opportunity in life. In the original position,
participants would prefer a system of rules that enabled thern to combine these
opportunities with those of employment and education over a system of rules
that required some individuals to make stark choices between religious ...
pursuits and the opportunities of employment and education. In order to realise
fair equality of opportunity between citizens, we thus ensure that their total sets
of basic or priuiary opportunities are roughly equal.
Quong's argument has merit from the standpoint of distributive justice,
but is problematic in one respect. He argues that exemptions are only
permissible, rather than required by justice, when the law burdens individu-
als with religious or cultural beliefs and that disadvantage does not affect the
ability of individuals to avail themselves of the basic opportunities of
citizenship: educational and employment opportunities. By contrast, many
have the intuition that exemptions may be required as a matter ofjustice even
in cases in which educational and employment opportunities are not affected.
Quong's account identifies the clearest cases in which an exemption may be
required by justice, but there may be others. For instance, when a law of
general application incidentally burdens religious believers by preventing
them from engaging in sacramental or littirgical practices, an exemption may
be required by justice - depending, of course, on a contextual assessnent of
the burden placed on the state and the costs to other citizens were such an
exemption to be granted.
aRawls op cit note 12 at 192.
..o Quong op cit note 71 at 58.
"I Ibid at 64.
2 lbid at 66, emphasis in original .
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V EGALITARIAN ARGUMENTS FOR EXEMPTIONS
A third argunent for exemptions is grounded on the unfairness in the way in
which, in modern democracies, some groups are treated relative to others. 0
I want to consider two variants of this egalitarian argument. 'The first
proceeds by noting that in modern democracies legislatures representing
majorities make laws that permit the religious practices of the majority. This
disadvantages menibers of minority religious groups, whose religious prac-
tices are not similarly accomniodated. They stiffer a burden not imposed on
menibers of the majority. In terms of this argument, fairness requires that
redress be offered to the disadvantaged minorities in the form of reciprocal
accominodation." Langa CJ advances this justification for exemptions in
Pillay, which involved a claim for an exemption by a Hindu pupil to permit
her to wear a nose stud prohibited by a school uniforin regulation:
'[T]he [school uniform] code has a disparate impact on certain religions and
cultures. The norm embodied in the code is not neutral, but enforces
mainstream and historically privileged forms of adornment, such as ear-studs,
which also involve the piercing of a body part, at the expense of minority and
historically excluded forms. It thus places a burden on learners who are unable
to express themselves fully and rnust attend school in an environment that does
not completely accept them.'
A second egalitarian argument is that if the religious practices of members
of any religious group, not necessarily the majority group, are accomniodated by
law (in the form of exemptions or otherwise), then fairness demands that in
relevantly similar circumstances the religious practices of other groups should
be accommodated, in the form of exemptions if appropriate. O'Regan J
justifies granting an exemption in Pillay on these grounds. She implies, pace
Langa CJ, that the school uniform was neutral, but since the school had
granted exemptions in relevantly similar cases to permit 'the wearing of
"Lakshmi strings" at certain times of the year; and the wearing of hide
bracelets to mark respect after a funeral', fairness requires the granting of an
exemption to a Hindu pupil to permit her to wear a nose-stud.i16 'Exeinp-
tions had in the past been afforded to others ... so the justification afforded
by the school does not establish the fairness of the refusal in this case.'io7
As Stuart White observes, however, neither of these two egalitarian
arguments (arguments grounded in the unfairness of accommodating some
but not others equally deserving) can be accepted as complete justifications for
no In this section, I draw extensively from Stuart White's excellent essay 'Exenip-
tions as an egalitarian demand', available at http://iew.clb.ac.il/workshops/2011/
articles/ hite.pdf accessed on 10 November 2011.
104 See, for examples of this argument, Michael McConnell'Free exercise revision-
ism and the Smtiith decision' (1990) Uivrersity of Chicago LR 1109 at 1130-6; Stephen
Carter ThieCulture ofDisbelief Ho A ia Law id Politic Trivialize Reigiois DecVo-
tion (1993) 126-8; and Nussbaum op cit note 32 at 116-19 and 164.
'0 Pillay supra note 3 at para 44.
16 bid para 170.
10 Ibid para 164.
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exemptions, because it may be that the initial accommodations relative to
which those seeking an exemption are being compared may not themselves
be justified.1 os If the initial accommodations are uljtustified (non-
comparatively), then justice may require not that initial accommodations be
extended via further accommodations to other religious groups, but that
existing accommodations be withdrawn. These egalitarian arguments would
support only a 'second-best policy' for exemptions: if there are pragmatic
reasons in favour of retaining the existing accommodations, then fairness
requires that these accommodations be made reciprocal.1 'o
Another weakness of these egalitarian arguments is that if no accommoda-
tions have been made as an initial matter, even though such accommodations
would be justified non-comparatively, then egalitarian arguments in favour
of an exemption would be unsu.ccessfiul. But in cases in which religious
believers are entitled to an exemption as a non-comparative matter, their
entitlement should not depend on whether other similarly situated groups
have been accommodated. o Accordingly, egalitarian arguments for exemp-
tions are neither sufficient nor necessary to make a case for exemptions in a
completely just society. Nevertheless, the failure to accommodate members
of a religious group when other, similarly situated religious believers have
been accommodated may be unfair and this failure may constitute an
injustice.1 " Considerations of fairness may therefore justify the granting of
exemptions.
In light of these deficiencies in the two egalitarian arguments, we should
notice, for example, that the reason O'Regan J gives in Pillay for considering
the school's failure to grant an exemption unjustified - that it unfairly denies
to an exemption to a pupil in circumstances relevantly similar to pupils
previously granted exemptions - renders herjustification for an exemption
dependent on the school having previously granted exemptions from the
school uniform regulations in favour of other pupils. But if these previous
exemptions are unjustified (a possibility O'Regan J does not investigate),
absent pragmatic reasons in favour of retaining them, they should be
withdrawn rather than extended to the claimant in Pillay. Furthermore, had
the school not previously exempted pupils from the school uniform
regulations, the logic of O'ReganJ's argument commits her to upholding the
school's decision to withhold an exemption in favour of the Hindu pupil in
question. But that seems mistaken, for a pupil may have a right to an
exemption from a school uniform regulation to allow her to wear an item of
clothing or jewelry as a symbol of religious commitment, even if no
exemptions have previously been granted. She may be entitled to an
exemption on the grounds that individuals should have the opportunity to
pursue religious and cultural values, and should be in a position to combine
" White op cit note 103 at 8.
Ibid at 8.
lbidat9.
.n Ibid at 10.
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this opportunity with educational and employment opportunities. (I consid-
ered this justification for a right to exemptions in the previous section.) The
point is not that O'Regan J's egalitarian argument does not justify allowing
an exemption in Pillay - it may well do so -but that it is incompilte.
In an important recent book, Religious Freedom and thte Constitution,
Christopher Eisgruber & Lawrence Sager put forward an egalitarian argu-
ment in favour of exemptions. Their argument is grounded on the idea of
equial regard: the requirement that the state 'show the same concern for the
fundamental needs of all its citizens'. 112 Failures of equal regard occur because
minority religious groups are vuinierable to, and entitled to protection
against, discrimination. The comparably serious interests of minority reli-
gious groups may not be as favourably accommodated in law as are
mainstream sec.ular or religious interests and as a result they may be subject to
undeserved disadvantage. This anti-discrimination principle sometimes
justifies special solicitude for religious believers in the fomi of exemptions. 114
Significantly, Eisgruber & Sager do not think that religion is special relative to
secular commitments. They deny that religion merits advantageous treat-
ment; rather, religious believers are entitled to special constitutional solici-
tude in cases where they have been subjected to undeserve d disadvantage.
Eisgruber & Sager identify three kinds of failure of equal regard: cases in
which there is an actual inequality in the treatment of different religions;
cases in which there is an actual inequality in the treatment of religious
interests relative to secular interests such as physical disability and financial
hardship; and cases in which the law does not reflect actual unequal treatment
between religions, but a religious practice is burdened and it is possible to
detemine, through counterfactual reasoning, that the law would have
accommodated such a practice were a similar burden to be placed on a
majority, or more mainstream, religious practice.1
The difficulties with the egalitarian justifications of exemptions disctussed
above apply equally to Eisgruber & Sager's account. Their account cannot be
taken to offer a complete justification of religious exemptions because it
assumes that initial accommodations of nalority religious and sectular
interests are justified and then demands exemptions for minority religions on
the grounds of equality. 6 This leaves open the question whether the state
should ever, as a matter of non-comparative justice, accommodate religious
groups with respect to generally applicable laws. Furthemiore, the case for a
religious exemption will in Eisgruber & Sager's account depend on whether
the nalority have as an initial matter accommodated their religious or sec.ular
interests, or whether they would have made an accommodation had the
burden in question been placed on a nagority religious practice. The
11 Eisgruber & Sager op cit note 19 at 89.
Ibid at 59.
.. Ibid at 62.
" Ibid at 90-3.
"6White op cit note 103 at 13.
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justification for religious exemptions is held hostage to accommodations
made for other groups in relevantly similar circumstances, and what
accommodations the majority would make in relevantly similar circumstanc-
eS. Eisgruber & Sager respond to this objection by saying that 'special
needs are ubiquitous and accommodations for them are common. As a result,
it is nearly impossible to devise an example of a minority religious practice for
which there is no secular or mainstream analogue'.I" But, as White points
out, why should a given religious group's claim for an exemption depend on
whether 'some relevantly similar claim to an exemption has already been, or
would be, acknowledged'?11
In addition, Eisgruber & Sager's assertion that already accommodated
secular needs such as physical disability are 'plainly analogous'12) to religious
commitments in a way that ensures that religious interests are accommodated
on the same basis as disability, an assertion also made by Langa CJ in Pillay,121
is question-begging. As previously indicated, Dworkin and Brian Barry deny
that religious commitments can be assimilated to disabilities. This is not to
assert that Dworkin and Barry are correct, for arguments may be advanced to
show that religious beliefs should be accommodated in the same way that we
compensate those with disabilities. But Eisgruber & Sager offer no such
arguments.
VII THE SPECIALNESS OF CONSCIENCE, AGAIN
Each of the preceding three kinds of arguments offered in support of a right
to religious exemptions is either incomplete, under-inclusive, or fails to fit
exactly with widely-shared intuitions concerning the circumstances in which
religious exemptions should be granted. Nevertheless, there is some reason
to think that there is a right to exemptions in some ucm.sances. For example,
equality of opportunity arguments provide strong reasons to think that a
pupil in a school or an employee in a workplace may have a right to an
exemption from uniform or dress code regulations to permit her to wear
adornment or jewellery freighted with religious import. 122 And the two
egalitarian arguments I examined suggest that there may be circumstances in
which, because some religious believers have previously been accommo-
dated, fairness requires that redress be offered to other religious believers in
the form of reciprocal accommodation.
I am not sure, however, whether any of the theories I have so far
considered unequivocally supports the granting of an exemption in a case in
17 Eisgruber & Sager op cit note 19 at 104-8 refer to this objection as the problem
of 'accidentaljustice'.
I" bid at 107.
"' White op cit note 103 at 15.
12. Eisgruber & Sager op cit note 19 at 91.
121 PsidySupra note 3 paras 74-5.
l have argued that justice requires the granting of religious exemptions in these
circumstances in Patrick Lenta 'Muslim headscarves in the workplace and in schools'
(2007) 124 SALJ296.
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which no previous acconmiodations have been made, the believers in
question are not conscientiously conmiitted to engaging in the practice, and
equality of opportunity cannot be invoked to justify the right to an
exemption. As I have already stated, many people share the intuition that
religious believers may have a right to an exemption to permit them to use a
banned drug as part of their religious rituals, where the drug is central to the
liturgy of the church in question and its consumption does not harm or
violate the fundamental rights of others, even if the consumption of the drug
is not considered by believers as a conscientious commitment.123
I want to consider a final theory of religious exemptions, in many ways
attractive. which would accord a right to an exemption in these circum-
stances. In her recent book, Liberty of Conscience, Martha Nussbaum offers a
justification for conscience-based exemptions that defines conscience, idio-
syncratically, as 'the faculty with which each person searches for the ultimate
meaning of life', which is 'of intrinsic worth and value'. Respect for this
faculty is owed in virtue of its status as a 'capability' of people.124 '0From the
respect we have for the person's conscience ... it follows that we ought to
respect the space required by any activity that has the general shape of
searching for the ultimate meaning of life, except where that search violates
the rights of others or comes up against some compelling state interes t.'125
Conscience 'calls for special protection'in the form of exemptions.126
ml share this intuition. See Patrick Lenta 'Religious liberty and cultural accorn-
nodation' (2006) 122 SALJ352.
124 Nussbaum op cit note 32 at 168-9. Nussbaum op cit note 60 at 79 includes the
ability 'to search for ultimate meaning of life in one's own way, as among the central
human functional capabilities. Nussbaum's capabilities approach may be sunmiarised
briefly as follows: beginning with a list of functions that are of central importance in
human life, whatever else the person perceives or chooses, the capabilities approach
asks whether individuals are capable of them or not. It is 'a necessary condition of
justice for a basic political arrangement [that] it deliver to citizens a certain basic level
of capability' (ibid at 71). Nussbaum describes her 'list of capabilities as a long list of
opportunities for functioning, such that it is always rational to want thern whatever
else one wants' (ibid at 88). She includes in her list ofcapabilities, a list ofthings people
ought to be able to do and be, 'being able to use one's mind in ways protected by ...
freedom of religious exercise. Being able to search for the ultimate meaning of life in
one's own way' (ibid at 79).
125 Nussbaum op cit note 32 at 169. The 'metaphysical impulse', the inclination of
some toward a transcendentally grounded orientation in life, may have value by
providing an account of the essential nature of reality and how human life fits into it,
and in virtue of the consolation such an account may bring through the assuaging of
pain and the generation of a positive attitude towards the world. Accounts of the
meaning of life may be repositories of ethical values and aspirations. Having a concep-
tion of the meaning of life and life's ethical foundation inay contribute to the fulfill-
nent of some people. This may provide a reason for thinking that we should respect
whatever faculty is required to form such a conception and may provide a reason for
thinking that there is a presumption in favour of permitting people to live in accor-
dance with their beliefs about the meaning oflife and its ethical foundation.
16 Ibid at 169.
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Nussbaum's 'specialness of conscience' account is markedly different from
accounts already considered such as Galston's, since Nussbaum defines
conscience not as a matter ofpeople acting consistently with perceived moral
duties bearing on their conduct, but as a faculty people possess that enables
them to engage with ultimate, metaphysical issues. She does not restrict the
right to exemptions to cases in which performing an activity is a matter of
duty: 'to recognize a burden only when the conduct in question is absolutely
required by religion seems too prohibitive, ruling out cases of religiously
central conduct that has not been authoritatively ordained'. 127 Neither is her
account vulnerable to the objection that it unfairly treats religious connit-
ments as special relative to non-religious commitments, since she extends the
right to exemptions to claims by non-religious searchers after meaning 'who
can give a good account of themselves'.128 In Nussbaum's account, exenp-
tions may be justified in cases where the conduct in question is not required
yet is central to the believer's religion or sense of self
VIII CONCLUSION
That concludes my survey of arguments in favour of recognising a right to
exemptions. 'The extent to which these theories are successful in showing
that the granting of religious exemptions is not unfair is likely to be
controversial. Even supposing one or more theories successfully show that
there is a right to religious exemptions, questions to some extent supplenen-
tal to any of the four theories will have to be posed to establish which
claimants will have a right to exemptions:
1. 'To what extent does the claimant identify with the belief or set of beliefs
that cause her to be burdened and how central are these beliefs to her
conception of herself? 2 In general, the more central to a person's
identity a set of beliefs, the more she will be burdened when a collision
between these beliefs and the law prevents her from acting in accor-
dance with these beliefs. The greater the burden placed on the
individual, the stronger the claim for an exemption.
2. To what extent would the burdens imposed on religious believers by
the relevant law or regulation be lessened if they 'engaged in reasonable
coping behaviour that they ought to undertake'? 1o Could the religious
practice that is the subject of the claim reasonably be modified, qualified
or restricted?
3. Would granting an exemption impose costs on third parties? 'This may
be a reason to refuse to grant an exemption, or to grant an exemption
127 Ibid at 138.
' Ibid at 172. She endorses the US Supreme Court's decision in Seeger supra note
39 and Wlsh supra note 43.
129 The sincerity of the claimant's assertion that her opposition to conforming to the
relevant legal requirement is the result of a conflict between her beliefs and the
relevant law must, ofcourse, be established.
1 Arneson op cit note 74 at 1027.
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more limited in scope than that claimed. We should, as Miller suggests,
approach the issue of the costs that would be imposed by accommodat-
ing members of a group as a question of how the costs of cultural
diversity should be distributed between the citizens that make up
society. 1
4. How strong is the state's interest in having the law or regulation
enforced uniforily and without exception? At least some valid laws will
be able to achieve their purposes even if they are not uniformly
enforced.132 School uniform regulations are like this, since the purposes
that uniforms serve - discipline amongst other things - are unlikely to
be frustrated by granting an exemption to a Muslim pupil to permit her
to wear a headscarf. However, where granting an exemption would
seriously frustrate the purposes the law or regulation in question is
intended to further or would violate the rights of others, there may be
no room for an exemption. There can be no exemption to a law
proscribing murder. There can be no exemption to the rule mandating
that motorists drive on the side of the road legally designated.' 13
5. Does the relevant law already accommodate the religious beliefs of the
majority, or those of members of a minority group? If so, the granting of
an exemption may bejustified as a matter of comparativ ojustice.
1' Miller op cit note 89 at 55-8.
132 There is a dispute about how common such laws are. According to W illiam P
Marshall 'In defense of Smiith and free exercise revisionism' (1991) 58 Untiversity of
Chicago LR 308 at 312 'the state interest in a challenged regulation will seldom be
seriously threatened if only a few persons seek exemption from it'. For Barry op cit
note 9 at 62, by contrast, religious exemptions will only be justified under 'a cornbi-
nation of very precise conditions that are rarely satisfied all together. It must be
important to have a rule generally prohibiting conduct of a certain kind because, if
this is not so, the way in which to accommodate minorities is simply not to have a rule
at all. At the same time though, having a rule must not be so important as to preclude
allowing exemptions to it. We are left with cases in which uniformity is a value but
not a great enough one to override the case for exemptions'.
1 To grant such an exemption would violate what Jeremy Waldron 'Tolerance
and reasonableness' in Catriona McKinnon & Dario Castiglione (eds) The Culture of
Toleration in Dives Societies: Reasonable Tolerance (2003) 13 terms the criterion of
'compossibility'. That is, everyone should be permitted to travel safely on the road at
the same time.
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